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Abstract: Across the global construction industry, fatalities continue to occur from high-risk activities,
where the risk controls have been defined; however, these were unreliable. In the mining industry,
Critical Control Risk Management has provided positive results in reducing major accidents, which
raises the question, could the Critical Control approach reduce the fatality rate in the construction
industry? This study analyzed 10 years of serious and fatal incident investigation reports from
four international construction companies to (i) assess the reliability of their Critical Controls (CCs)
and (ii) assess the factors that affect the reliability of CCs. The results show the reliability of CCs,
measured by implementation and effectiveness, averaged just 42%. Insight into human performance
and organizational factors, including risk identification, decision-making and competency, together
with supervision, job planning and communication, were identified as opportunities to improve
the reliability of CCs. The study used bowtie diagrams with real event data to find the actual CC
reliability. This appears to be the first published study that reports on the reliability of critical risk
controls in construction. It demonstrates a feasible method for determining and communicating
control effectiveness that can be used to deliver meaningful insights to industry practitioners on
actual control performance and focus areas for improvement. In addition, actionable findings directly
related to individual CCs can be derived that enable the participating organization to focus resources
on improving specific verification processes. The results confirm the applicability of CCs for the Major
Accident Event hazards analyzed and highlights that further reviews are required on the factors that
need to be considered when implementing a CC program. This paper details our methodology and
results, to assist others applying CCs as a risk management tool.
Keywords: construction; safety; risk; hazard; critical control risk management; critical control;
fatality prevention
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1. Introduction
Accident prevention research has identified complex models of accident causation [1],
identifying multiple factors and numerous safety controls [2,3] to prevent incidents from
recurring. However, within the construction industry, serious and fatal incidents continue to
result from recurring causes [4]. Construction industry fatalities result from high-risk work
activities (e.g., operating heavy plant machinery, lifting using cranes, working at height [5]),
where the interaction between human factors and the activity gives rise to personal-safetyrelated fatalities. Equally, construction risk management strategies designed to prevent
fatality events (e.g., Life Saving Rules) have relied on human action and interventions to
identify hazards, assess risks and then treat the risk by defining and applying controls in
the workplace [6,7].
Human actions and interventions can introduce errors through variability in hazard identification and assessment within dynamic construction environments [8,9], with
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workers identifying, on average, only 53% of fatal hazards in the workplace [10]. In addition, human factors affect the compliance to critical controls [11], risk tolerance [12] and
decision-making [13], all of which influence the efficacy of control implementation and
effectiveness. Selleck and Cattani [14] proposed the construction industry focus on risk
treatment and applying a critical control approach to prevent fatalities and to learn from
similar programs being applied to process safety in the oil and gas or mining industries.
Critical Controls (CCs) are specific safety barriers, which (i) directly prevent the unplanned
release of energy, which cause major accident events, (ii) directly prevent the escalation of
event consequences or (iii) are unique controls within an event pathway.
The concept of safety barriers as a method of preventing and mitigating unwanted
events has been used extensively to identify the controls needed to address event causes and
consequences [15]. The bowtie method is often used to facilitate the identification of controls
for an unwanted event. The bowtie method was developed by joining fault tree and event
tree (cause and consequences) surrounding an unwanted event [16]. The bowtie method
has been used extensively in the aviation, nuclear, oil and gas and chemical processing
facilities to assess potential failure modes and quantify the adequacy of controls to prevent
accidents through risk assessment estimation techniques [7,17,18]. The process industries
have an established practice of identifying barriers as independent protection layers, with a
preference for hardware and technology reliability as barrier controls over human reliability.
The barriers are perceived as discrete onion-like layers, formed by mechanical devices,
instruments, alarms, administrative controls and post- release mitigation measures, all
acting independently [7]. However, an underlying factor is the influence of human action
and organizational factors, which affect the reliability of the barrier [7,19–21].
The reliability of control barriers is influenced by organizational psychological mechanisms, such as confirmation bias, normalization of warnings, consensus mode decisionmaking and group think, which occurs within work teams and across organizations [19].
Reliability of barriers is also affected by human factors (e.g., competence) and human
actions in the detection of threats or changes in barrier functionality, diagnose what action
is required and then act [20–22]. Construction accident causation analysis [23] identified
worker actions are heavily influenced by supervision and risk management through planning and risk control at different levels across the organization, emphasizing the need for a
holistic approach to managing fatal risks and the use of barriers.
The safety barrier methodology has been applied in the mining industry through
Critical Control Risk Management (CCRM). CCRM is focused on risk treatment by specifying and verifying the implementation and effectiveness of critical controls (barriers)
in a model addressing organizational and inherent human factors using the principals
of High-Reliability Organizations [24–26]. An adaptation of CCRM was piloted on an
Australian construction project [27]; however, further understanding of Critical Control
reliability was identified.
For construction organizations to invest in the development and implementation of
a safety barrier approach such as CCRM, organizational leaders who are accountable for
fatality prevention will need assurance that the controls being defined will prevent fatalities
(are they the ‘right’ controls?) and how will the reliability of the controls be measured?
Hassall et. al. [24], in a study on selection and optimization of risk controls, identified
control performance as the product of reliability in the control to perform within the work
environment and the adequacy of the control to prevent and/or mitigate unwanted events
across normal and abnormal situations (Figure 1). When considered in the context of
construction fatalities, regulators across multiple jurisdictions reported that between 85%
and 90% of fatalities are events occurring from common high-risk activities, where controls
that prevent the incident are defined within organization safety management systems, but
still result in single to two-person fatalities [4,28,29]. In summary, construction industry
fatality events continue to be caused by the same high-risk activities and hazards due to
failures in control reliability and less from novel or abnormal situations, where they are not
defined or are inadequate in preventing the novel events.
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control reliability. It also explores the use of bowtie diagrams as a means of presenting the
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Table 1. CC data transformation.
Event Assessment
Criteria

Code Response

Output Variable

Calculated Output

Yes

Number of times CC
Challenged

∑n (CC = “yes”)

No

-

-

Yes

Number of times CC
implemented

∑n (CC = “yes”)

No

Number of times CC
not implemented

∑n (CC = “no”)

Inadequate
Poor
Good

Adequacy score

∑n (CC = “adequate”)

CC Contributing
factor

CC Implemented

CC Adequacy rating

NOTE: n = number of times CC was assessed.

2.3. Calculating Control Reliability
Two values were calculated from the CC assessment and converted into percentage
values:
number of times the CC was implemented × 100
Implementation ratio (%) =
(2)
number of occasions the control was challenged
CC effectiveness (%) =

number of times the CC was rated adequate (i.e., good) × 100
number of occasions the control was challenged

CC Reliability (%) = Implementation ratio × CC effectiveness ratio

(3)
(4)

Critical control reliability percentages were mapped against the MAE hazard Bowtie.
The mapping of the result from applying real data calculations for individual CC reliability
to the bowtie is a novel extension of bowtie analysis that visually highlighted control
gaps and provided feedback on the performance of control pathways and improvements
required in the verification processes.
2.4. Failure Rate by CC Hierarchy of Control Type
CC reliability ratings were compared by hierarchy of control type of CC for each MAE
category to review the reliability of CC type. Observations on critical control gaps and
improvements were collated and provided to the participating organizations.
2.5. CC Comparative Performance by Implementation and Effectiveness Ratios
The data were analyzed using R statistical package [37] applying exploratory analysis
steps to understand the relationships and strength of relationships between variables. Oneway ANOVA was applied to the implementation and effectiveness ratio (%) variables to
understand the importance of the measures in assisting construction projects to improve
CC management.
2.6. Human Ethics Statement
The research was conducted in accordance with Edith Cowan University Human
Research Ethics Committee (HREC) approval for Project number 20293 Selleck granted on
12 June 2018 (valid from 12 June 2018 to 31 March 2022) which meets the requirements of
the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research.
No harm has resulted from the focus group process or the analysis of the reports.
3. Results
Sourcing of actual potentially fatal consequence investigation reports from construction companies is problematic, as the reports are highly confidential and often subject to
legal privilege. The value of the research to the participating organizations and grouping
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of data across multiple companies made the research possible given the sensitivity of the
event and causal factors. This resulted in 186 serious and fatal event investigation reports
collated, covering a period from July 2011 to December 2019. Five investigations were
rejected due to insufficient detail on contributing causes. The events were sorted by MAE
category (Table 2), with all events assessed; however, statistical analysis was limited to
MAE categories where there were greater than 30 event reports, which included: Lifting
Operations; Mobile Equipment/Light Vehicles; Stored Energy and Working at Height.
Table 2. Number of L4/L5 Event Reports by category.
Fatal Risk (MAEs)

Number of Events

Fatal Risk (MAEs)

Number of Events

Excavations
Fall of Ground

3
12

2
30

Fire & Explosion

4

Lifting Operations
Light Vehicle
Machinery & Equipment
Safeguarding

49
10

Marine Operations
Mobile Equipment
Falling & Rolling
Objects
Stored Energy
Working at Height

1
33
36

0

Lifting Operation comprised the strongest frequency rate (27%) of all events and
mobile equipment, stored energy and working at height represented, collectively, 87% of
all events analyzed. Where the event report did not provide sufficient information to assess
the event or the event related to another failure mode, these were rejected (Table 3).
Table 3. Data analyzed by MAE category.
High Risk Activity

Number of Event
Report

% Events

Number Rejected

Operating Mobile
Plant and Equipment

40

22%

4

Lifting Operations

49

27%

0

Stored Energy

33

18%

7

Working at Height

36

20%

5

The most frequent MAE hazards included ‘driving interactions and operator error’,
‘lifting operations—dropped load’, ‘uncontrolled electrical energy release’ and ‘falls due to
access/egress from plant or unstable ground’ (Figure 4).

Safety
Safety 2022,
2022, 8,
8, 64
x FOR PEER REVIEW

of 25
23
8 8of

Figure 4. Proportion of events by MAE hazard.
Figure 4. Proportion of events by MAE hazard.

Figure 4. Proportion of events by MAE hazard.
3.1. Critical
Control Performance Measures

3.1. Critical Control Performance Measures
Implementation
of CCs across all MAE categories was analyzed at an average 57
Implementation
of
across
all MAE
categories
was
at
57%,
Implementation
of CCs
categories
was analyzed
analyzedvariation
at an
an average
average
57%,
with a standard deviation
of +/−
35.5%,
indicating
considerable
in the
implem
indicating
considerable
variation
in the
with a standard
standarddeviation
deviationofof+/−
+/35.5%,
− 35.5%,
indicating
considerable
variation
inimplementhe impletationtation
of CCs.
Effectiveness
of
theCCs
CCswhen
when
implemented
averaged
41.2%,
with a stan
of CCs.
Effectiveness
of theof
implemented
averaged
41.2%,41.2%,
with a with
standmentation
of CCs.
Effectiveness
the CCs when
implemented
averaged
a
ard deviation
of
+/−
38.6%.
(Figure
5).
The
performance
of
CCs
had
limited
ard
deviation
of +/−
38.6%.
(Figure
5). The
performance
of of
CCs
standard
deviation
of +/
− 38.6%.
(Figure
5). The
performance
CCshad
hadlimited
limited reliability
reliability reliabil
(23%),
withwith
a high
rate
(+/−
37%)
in preventing
or mitigating
MAE
with
high
rateof
ofvariability
variability(+/
(+/−
ininpreventing
or
MAE
or threats
(23%),
aa high
rate
of
variability
−37%)
37%)
preventing
ormitigating
mitigating
MAE threats
threats
consequences.
consequences.

Figure 5. Statistical comparison of control performance measures.

Comparison of CC performance measures (implementation, effectiveness) by MAE
category
(Figurecomparison
6) identifiedof
Mobile
Equipment
(77%)measures.
and Lifting Operations (77.2%) as
Figure
5. Statistical
control
performance
Figure
5. Statistical
comparison of control
performance
measures.
having the strongest CC implementation rate, with Stored Energy (24.5%) having, overall,

Comparison of CC performance measures (implementation, effectiveness) by M
category (Figure 6) identified Mobile Equipment (77%) and Lifting Operations (77.2%)
having the strongest CC implementation rate, with Stored Energy (24.5%) having, over

Safety 2022, 8, 64

Safety 2022, 8, x FOR PEER REVIEW

9 of 23

of 25
Comparison of CC performance measures (implementation, effectiveness) by9MAE
category (Figure 6) identified Mobile Equipment (77%) and Lifting Operations (77.2%) as
having the strongest CC implementation rate, with Stored Energy (24.5%) having, overall,
the weakest
rate.
The
CCCC
effectiveness
rate rate
was, was,
on average,
30% lower
the
weakestCC
CCimplementation
implementation
rate.
The
effectiveness
on average,
30%
than
the
CC
implementation
across
the
MAE
categories,
except
for
Stored
Energy.
lower than the CC implementation across the MAE categories, except for Stored Energy.

Figure 6. Overall critical control performance by MAE category.
Figure 6. Overall critical control performance by MAE category.

Comparison
of CCs
Comparison of
CCs by
by the
the hierarchy
hierarchy of
of control
control types
types was
was conducted
conducted using
using the
the control
control
types
defined
in
the
CC
data
set
used
for
comparative
analysis
[27].
In
this
model,
the
types defined in the CC data set used for comparative analysis [27]. In this model, the higher
higher
levels
of
the
hierarchy
of
controls
‘elimination’
and
‘substitution’
are
not
applied,
levels of the hierarchy of controls ‘elimination’ and ‘substitution’ are not applied, as the
as
theisfocus
is on and
action
and verification
in the
field.
The ‘administrative’
controls
aredown
brofocus
on action
verification
in the field.
The
‘administrative’
controls are
broken
ken
down
by
the
action
taken,
e.g.,
‘inspection’,
‘monitoring’,
‘procedural’
and
‘compeby the action taken, e.g., ‘inspection’, ‘monitoring’, ‘procedural’ and ‘competency’. The
tency’.
The comparison
identified Engineering
controls
having the
strongest
rate of imcomparison
identified Engineering
controls as having
theasstrongest
rate
of implementation
plementation
(73.3%),
with
the
other
control
types
ranging
between
46.7%
and
53.6%.
En(73.3%), with the other control types ranging between 46.7% and 53.6%. Engineering and
gineering
and
administrative
procedural
CCs
had
similar
effectiveness
ratings
at
47.6%
administrative procedural CCs had similar effectiveness ratings at 47.6% and 45.5%, with
and
45.5%,
with the between
rest performing
between
and
35.9% (Figure 7a–d).
the rest
performing
34.5% and
35.9% 34.5%
(Figure
7a–d).
Engineering
controls
are
closely
monitored
by
field
construction
managers
and
proEngineering controls are closely monitored by field construction
managers
and
project
ject
engineers
as part
of monitoring
the integrity
the facility
constructed,
with
the
engineers
as part
of monitoring
the integrity
of theoffacility
beingbeing
constructed,
with the
extra
extra
reflected
the higher
implementation
ratetoand,
to aextent,
lesser the
extent,
the adefocus focus
reflected
in the in
higher
implementation
rate and,
a lesser
adequacy
of
quacy
of the engineering
controls compared
to the
other
control types.
the engineering
controls compared
to the other
control
types.
Comparing hierarchy of CC types across the MAE categories, the Stored Energy CCs
have a consistently lower rate of implementation yet deliver a higher rate of effectiveness
(Figure 7c).
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and Mobile Plant and Equipment only 62.5% of the time.
In total, 119 CCs were assessed across the four MAE categories, and all were found
to be a primary causal factor in a minimum of one MAE incident when the CC was not
implemented or effective. This was a fundamental assessment of whether controls being
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evaluated were Critical Controls. It was observed that CCs could also be contributory factors in MAE incidents.
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3.2. Lifting Operations
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of implemented
lifting operation
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rate when
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8). an overall average of 46%, with five CCs
being 100% effective and six CCs being 0% effective (Figure 8). The stability of crane or
lifting devices has the least level of prevention control, with six of the seven CCs having
weak effectiveness ratings, with an average of 11.5%.
All Lifting Operation MAE hazards compromised CC prevention pathways with two
or more CC effectiveness measures being compromised by having a 50% or lower failure
rate when the control is implemented (Figure 8).
3.3. Mobile Plant and Equipment
Mobile Plant and Equipment MAE hazards had, overall, a high level of implementation
of CCs, with 11 of the 22 CCs having a greater than 80% implementation rate, with an
overall average of 77% (Figure 9), marginally behind Lifting Operations (Figure 5).
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CCs that managed Operator Error Hazards had a strong implementation average at
85%, with the two lower implementation rates (67%) associated with operating within
vehicle specifications and driving off road with roll-over protection. The weakest level of
CC implementation (47%) was heavy vehicles or plant operators not responding to alarms.
The CC implementation and effectiveness ratings for the Unsecured Loads MAE hazard are
indicative only as the CCs were only challenged twice by the assessment of incident events.
The effectiveness of mobile plant and equipment CCs has an overall average of 48%,
with two CCs associated with emergency response drills being 100% effective and two CCs
(excluding the Unsecured Loads MAE hazards noted above) being 0% effective. One of
the two completely not effective was heavy vehicles or plant operators not responding to
alarms (Figure 9).
The vehicle failure MAE hazard has the strongest level of prevention control, with
all CCs in the prevention pathway having CC effectiveness ratings above 62%, with an
average of 74.9%. The least effective prevention pathway is associated with driving on site,
where the effectiveness ratings of five from seven are weak (<50%) and range between 0
and 33.3% (Figure 9). Three of the four Mobile Plant and Equipment MAE hazards have
compromised CC prevention pathways, with two or more CC effectiveness measures being
compromised by having a 50% or lower failure rate when the control is implemented.
3.4. Stored Energy
In total, 36 major accident events were analyzed that were associated with stored
energy. Uncontrolled Electrical Energy Release was the most common MAE event by which
personnel were harmed, with inadequate isolation methods and application of exclusion
zones around live systems. Contributing to the failure of isolation methods was due to
perceived schedule pressure, either from the issuing of permits without full validation (“we
needed to get the permit issued as work had already been held up”) or isolation placed on
the wrong system (“crew were waiting to start”).
An average 4.4% of events analyzed identified the critical controls as not implemented
as the primary failure. Failure to apply isolations and/or exclusion zones was identified as
a common failure across all Stored Energy MAEs (Figure 10).
3.5. Working at Height
In total, 36 working at height major accident events were analyzed. Falling Down:
access and egress and working on unstable ground together with Dropped Objects were
the most common MAE events by which personnel were harmed due to inadequate design
of access/egress, inspections and maintaining exclusion zones and inadequate risk and
simultaneous operation assessments.
An average 10.5% of events analyzed identified the critical controls were not implemented as the primary failure. Failure to undertake inspections of work environment,
pre-start/pre-use inspections and fall protection and inadequate job planning were identified as a common failure across all Working at Height MAEs (Figure 11).
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3.6. CC Improvements and Gap Analysis
In total, eighteen (18) CC performance improvements and nine (9) gaps in CC specifications were identified during the event analysis (Table 4). The recommendations provide
insight into the type of errors that contributed to the incident events, including design failures, system errors and human factors. The CC performance improvements and gaps were
not able to be validated beyond the statements provided within the historical investigation
reports. The recommendations provide insight into the type of CC performance errors
occurring historically and areas for management focus in current projects.
Table 4. Identified improvements and gaps in Critical Controls by MAE category.
Identified CC Performance Improvement

Identified Gaps in CC Specifications

•
•
•
Lifting
Operations

•
•
•

•
•

Mobile Plant
and Equipment

•

•

•
•
•
Stored Energy

•

•
•
•
Working at
Height

•
•

The quality, definition and details provided in lift plans
Identifying, delineating and communication of line of
fire exclusion zones
Control of exclusion zones (requirement for trained
and competent spotters)
Communication between crane operators and riggers
Competency of crane operators/riggers used for the
task being performed

Load factors for trucks and mobile equipment not
defined or applied in work activities
Malfunction of automated processes, vehicle proximity
alerts/alarms—inadequate inspection, maintenance,
and testing. Deliberately disabled.
Operator fitness for work—fatigue, under the
influence of drugs/alcohol, mental distraction, and
physical conditions.
Personnel operating within blind spots, line of fire and
inadequate use of the spotters for tramming, reversing,
and loading/unloading operations
Inadequate traffic/pedestrian segregation
Personal discipline to use isolations and lock out
system.
Identification, installation, and monitoring of exclusion
zones
Permit to work application—wrong systems identified,
systems not de-energized and inadequate lock out/tag
out.
Line of fire assessment
Engineering and design reviews of new
scaffolding/barrier systems
Competency of personnel installation/using
scaffolding (e.g., overloading) and managing materials,
tools and equipment when working at height
Integrity of work surfaces—multiple trips/slips on
work platforms
Design of working at height systems, anchor points
and hookup by work team members

•

•

Mechanical locking system mandated for
storage of crane booms during transit
Overhaul and/or major maintenance
service of lifting devices to apply NDT to
all critical welds and joints and ensure
lubrication/inspection of critical
components.
Safety critical materials (e.g., rigging
components) required for lifting operations
are identified, sourced, and applied
as designed.

•

Development of loading/unloading critical
controls—positions/lifting/offloading with
heavy equipment

•

Risk assessments extend beyond project
perimeter to include tramming route of
mobile equipment (e.g., overhead
power lines)
Line of fire risk assessments to include
securing systems (e.g., chains, clamps)

•

•

Design, inspection and loading
specifications of temporary works
including loading platforms
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4. Discussion
The research evaluated historical incident investigation reports of significant construction incidents for four international construction companies across a ten-year period. The
study evaluated known CCs, as documented in existing high-risk activity performance
standards, to identify performance factors that affect the reliability of CCs. The relative
control reliability level for each of the CCs was calculated to provide a baseline measure for
future assessment of construction critical controls. The analysis does provide insights into
the applicability of CCs for the construction industry and factors affecting CC reliability
across the different hazard categories.
4.1. Validity of Construction CCs
One of the key questions asked by the construction companies participating in the
study and one of the aims of the study was to determine whether the CCs being applied in
their organizations are the ‘right’ CCs to prevent major-accident events. The CC verification
process requires management investment in resources to undertake the verification tasks,
monitor performance, report on the risks and is expected to demonstrate management
duty of care in respect to MAE risks. The CCs applied in the companies were reviewed by
internal construction and safety professionals. However, no definitive review against majorincident events was conducted and the organizations continued to experience significant
incidents post the implementation of the CC verification process. The study confirmed
all 119 CCs being applied by the organizations were valid, with a further 7 CCs being
recommended. The additional seven CCs were recommended for MAE hazards where the
threat was not identified (e.g., loading/unloading from haulage vehicles) or there were
gaps in the control specification.
The type of CC gaps occurred across a range of control types, including engineering,
inspection and procedural, which focus on the higher end of hierarchy of controls. By
contrast, observations on factors affecting implementation of the CCs identified gaps in
lower-level hierarchy controls. The gaps included procedural, administrative and training
associated with human performance factors, resulting in CCs not being implemented.
All four major-accident event categories were found to have a high proportion of
weakly or not implemented Critical Controls and, therefore, were not effective in preventing
the release of hazardous energies. The CCs rated ‘weak’ (<50% reliability) were considered
unreliable as they failed more times than the CC was effective. The ratings (weak, needs
improvement, strong) highlight where construction organizations need to prioritize action
to improve implementation and the quality of the CC being considered. The ratings also
inform where CC verification programs need to prioritize organizational effort to validate
CC reliability. In the case of Working at Height events (Figure 8), three of the control
pathways (i.e., falling down, working from scaffolding, working from man cage) identified
each Critical Control as being weakly implemented or not effective. For example, Falling
from Scaffold identified three CCs as being implemented: design of the scaffold, inspections
on standard of scaffold being built and scaffold foundation inspections; however, only
the design CC was assessed as being only 20% effective. Similarly, when assessed in the
overall context of the study, the CCs that had a high reliance on human performance (e.g.,
operating plant and vehicles, inspections, maintaining exclusion zones) had a higher rate of
failure (Figure 6), which aligns to hierarchy of control principles [23]. Human performance
factors that affect either the implementation or quality of the Critical Control, including
decisions to intervene when a CC is not performing as specified, need further consideration.
The Stored Energy hazard category provides a case in point, with Stored Energy events
having the least proportion (18%) of incident events in the study. Arguably, Stored Energy
should have the best CC performance. Comparing hierarchy of CC type across the MAE
categories, the Stored Energy CCs have a consistently lower rate of implementation yet
deliver a higher rate of effectiveness (Figure 6). All four Stored Energy MAE hazards
had a minimum of two CCs assessed as having a 100% reliability rating (Figure 8). These
CCs were engineering and inspection-type controls and, whilst overall more effective in
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the absence of other CCs (i.e., those relying on human performance), the incident events
still occurred.
4.2. Human Performance Factors
The analysis of the incident investigation reports identified a range of organizational,
supervisory and human performance factors contributing to poor implementation of CCs.
Eighteen (18) recommendations on improving implementation of CCs (Table 3) provide
insight into the type of human performance factors affecting CC implementation and
effectiveness. These are observations made by the experienced panel members to assist
construction organizations intending to implement CCRM or improve management focus
on the verification of CCs.
The failure to recognize hazards was identified across multiple incidents, particularly
when working in and around mobile plants, where personnel were working in blind
spots (reversing plant), in the line of fire (swinging loads), during loading/unloading of
equipment and working above others. Failure to recognize hazards adversely impacts the
effectiveness and reliability of critical controls, as human actions are not applied either to
implement the Critical Control or act when the Critical Control deviates from the required
specified standard [22]. The analysis identified multiple MAE incidents where an erosion
in control integrity or changes in barrier functionality (e.g., exclusion barriers, maintenance
of scaffold in use, proximity alarms) were tolerated by the work team and supervision.
Where the risks become normalized through repetition or familiarity (e.g., continuously
working around mobile plant, working on scaffolding), workers are desensitized to the risk
exposure and become ‘complacent’ [19]. Under these circumstances, workers are less likely
to respond to changing conditions, resulting in the type of ‘line of fire’ incidents observed
in the study. This has implications in the design, implementation and operational integrity
of a CCRM program where the reliability of the CC can be eroded.
Failures were identified in the competency of crane operators and riggers, application
of work permits to isolate stored energy, spotters failing to maintain exclusions zones
around plant and equipment or ineffective communication with mobile plant operators
(Table 3). The incident investigations readily identified competency, (i.e., inexperienced or
untrained workers) as a factor when CCs were not implemented. Competency, as a factor in
CCs that were not applied to the standard required, is more complex. Worker competency
is linked to their ability to either adapt the standards to the work or decide to stop work and
seek clarification from supervision and management [38,39]. In both options, the CC system
must provide direction on how to manage deviations [38], as major-incident investigation
studies identified deviations from controls (rules/barriers) that are inevitable in high-risk
industries, including construction [12,39–41]. One option to improve competency and
consistent application of controls (rules) was to improve the specificity of the control and
detail the control tolerance limits [13].
CC reliability was attributed to an individual’s decision making, which resulted in
aberration from accepted safety standards (e.g., not fit for work, not applying danger lock
and tag), substandard actions (e.g., inadequate inspections) or errors and lapses (e.g., wrong
system isolated) (Table 3). Individual risk-based decision making in the application of
CCs (rules and/or barriers) is influenced by a complex interface of personal, work team,
organizational and psychological factors [13,19,38]. Rules are perceived as ‘guidance’,
with workers applying adaptive thinking to achieve work tasks and goals [42]. Further
investigation into individual’s decision making and the impact on CC implementation and
effectiveness would benefit construction organizations looking to improve CC reliability.
Maintaining risk awareness is an inherent duty of supervisors through job planning
and risk reviews, which focus on the hazards inherent in the tasks being undertaken and
how hazards will be controlled [43–45]. Both factors were identified as being inadequate
and contributed to the events analyzed. Winge [23] identified immediate supervision as
strongly connected to worker actions, with the effectiveness of supervision a direct factor
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of job planning and risk management. In the absence of effective supervision, workers are
less likely to act to implement or maintain CCs.
A major impact on job planning is the reactive nature of construction due to delays
in the provision of materials, plant, equipment or labor, which causes compression of the
schedule [46]. The delays result in perceived production pressure to ‘get the job done’,
meaning work teams and supervisors become focused on task completion and fail to
recognize changes in the work environment or hazards [8,47] or continue to work in the
absence of effective safety supervision [23]. Where production pressure adversely affects
safety performance through compression of work schedules [46,48] or rework from poor
quality of execution [49], this also impacts performance of control barriers that rely on
human action [7].
By focusing on CCs, construction organizations become more resilient as risk assessment, integrated into all systems; the verification process identifies and eliminates problems
before they occur [48]. The study used historical incident data where the risk maturity of the
participant organizations was reactive or, at best, risk compliant [48,50]. As organizations
further develop and improve CCRM, the verification audits provide additional data to
model safety performance. This shifts management focus from incidents (lagging measure)
to proactive risk management and provides opportunities for predicting risks.
4.3. Limitations
The calculated control reliability level is biased and over represents the failure rate, as
the assessment was conducted on incident events with known control failures and does not
represent every time a Critical Control was challenged when executing work. The Critical
Controls assessed did not cover all construction high-risk activities and were limited to four
hazard categories. Equally, the study did not assess various cultural factors (e.g., language,
religion, societal structures) and commercial and delivery strategies (e.g., self-perform,
subcontractor, joint ventures), which potentially impact control of construction project fatal
hazards.
5. Conclusions
The study confirmed that the controls identified for the four MAE hazard categories
(Lifting Operations, Mobile Plant and Equipment, Stored Energy, Working at Heights) were
valid as CCs through the control of energies associated with high-risk construction activities.
Implementing and maintaining a CCRM is a significant investment in time, resources and
cost, all of which are significantly constrained in the construction environment [48]. Senior
managers want assurance that the investment in CCRM delivers safety improvements,
which, in the absence of incidents, is difficult to quantify. Construction organizations
participating in the research questioned the validity of CCRM to prevent potentially fatal
accidents, specifically how does the organization know effort is invested in the ‘right’
CCs? The study was able to validate CCs for the four MAE hazards tested and identified
gaps in CC standards within the safety management system (s), which the organizations
were able to act upon. The methodology of CCRM incident analysis provides a basis to
improve incident investigation root cause analysis by comparing incident root causes to
CCs generating focused improvement actions. The study did highlight a need for further
research how to measure the impact CCRM has in preventing serious incidents within a
construction project.
The study provided insight into the individual and organizational factors, which
potentially impact the reliability of CCs. Human performance factors, including hazard
identification, personal decision making and competency, were common findings in the
investigation reports analyzed. Worker competency was attributed to inexperience or lack
of training or the lack of competency to assess, adapt and apply CCs to the work activity
being conducted.
In complex construction environments, individuals need to be adaptive in the application of the CC to the situation, not just follow a black and white ‘rule’. It is the competency
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to apply CCs to the work environment that individuals need to develop, which informs
their decision to stop work when the ‘rule’ is found not to apply to the situation. In the
absence of an organization providing clear direction regarding CC deviations, failures will
occur as workers influenced by their own risk perceptions will decide on how and whether
to apply the CC and to what standard. The human performance factors can be addressed
by the organization improving worker competency to assess and apply CCs across all
high-risk tasks and, critically, the actions and/or behavior of competent supervisors to
verify CC implementation and effectiveness for the given task being undertaken.
Organizational factors also contributed to the reliability of CCs. Supervisors having
reacted to changes in construction schedule, materials and labor resourcing failed to
undertake the CC activities, including job planning, risk assessments or communicating
the risks and CCs to the work team.
The study benefits construction organizations applying CCs as a risk management
tool as the results confirm the applicability of CCs for the MAE hazards analyzed and
highlight the factors that need to be considered when implementing a CC program. Organizational processes need to ensure supervision and workers are trained and competent
in the application of CCs, direction is provided to manage deviations and management
oversight to ensure implementation and quality is maintained. The method presented
and the use of the bowties to illustrate the results represents a novel contribution to the
literature on controlling fatal risks on construction sites. Future work to continue the
contribution to research is planned to extend the analysis to additional risks and additional
construction projects.
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